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Abstract— In the last few years, Delay/Disruption Tolerant 
Networking has grown to a healthy research topic because of 
its suitability for challenged environments characterized by 
heterogeneity, long delay paths and unpredictable link 
disruptions. This paper presents a DTN security architecture 
that focuses on the requirements for lightweight key 
management; lightweight AAA-like architecture for 
authentication/authorisation; resilience to Denial of Service 
attacks and user anonymity.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today's Internet protocols perform poorly when faced 
with heterogeneous environments characterized by very long 
delay paths and possible link disruptions such as satellite and 
sensor networks. These environments often referred to as 
“Challenged Networks”, become even worse when coupled 
with terminals characterized by severe power or memory 
constraints. In addition, communication outside of the 
Internet is usually accomplished on independent networks, 
each supporting specialized communication requirements.  
Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) is 
promising network architecture for heterogeneous 
environments. It aims at solving both challenged networks 
problems and independent networks incompatibility [1],[2]. 
It works as overlay architecture on top of independent 
networks, including the Internet. DTN offers an application 
interface structured around an optionally-reliable store and 
forward packet exchange, with restricted or null expectations 
of end-to-end connectivity and possibly limited node 
resources. 
The DTN architecture was designed to accommodate not 
only network connection disruptions, but also to provide a 
framework for dealing with lower layers heterogeneity by 
introducing a new layer called “Bundle” layer. It works on 
top of transport layer to better handle the long delays or 
disconnectivity and high loss rate due to disruption by using 
store-forward-mechanism. The data (called bundle) is stored 
in persistent storage on each DTN device and is forwarded to 
other node when the link is available.  
There are three main components in DTN architecture: 
Node (or Bundle Node), Router and Gateway as shown in 
Figure 1.  Every DTN node is aware of the bundle layer 
which helps to provide better performance in high 
delays/disruptions and data loss environment. DTN routers 
work in one network region (areas having similar networking 
technology) while DTN gateways work in different network 
regions to handle different transport, network, and link 
layers.  More details on DTN architecture are available in 
[2].  
 
Figure 1. DTN Layers Stack  
 
This paper focuses on security issues in the application of 
DTN architecture to satellite and sensor networks. This may 
include scenarios such as United Nation (UN) peacekeeping 
forces, environmental and disaster monitoring, 
Governmental or Non-Governmental Organizations (GOs 
and NGOs) aid in underdeveloped regions of the world. 
We will elaborate the UN peacekeeping in war zones and 
conflict areas scenario and use it as the motivation and 
framework for the rest of the work in this paper. This will be 
the bases of threat analysis, security requirements and derive 
the security architecture that satisfies these requirements. 
The global scale of this scenario requires collaboration 
between various security domains such as satellite operators 
(e.g. Inmarsat), UN headquarters in New York and local 
governments in the conflict area. This scenario is suitable for 
use of satellites and also suitable for DTN because of the 
unreliable and unscheduled communications. 
Figure 2 shows the UN peacekeeping scenario with 4 
satellite terminals in independent regions. Each region has 
DTN Gateway (DTN-G). DTN-G1 and DTN-G2 represent 
the UN sensors and communications networks in two 
different areas of the conflict region (e.g. UK and US 
soldiers working under UN control). DTN-G3 represents the 
local government or an aid organisation region (e.g. Red 
         
Cross) and DTN-G4 represents the UN headquarter.  Both 
DTN-G3 and DTN-G4 are connected to the public internet to 
provide limited services to the local population in the conflict 
area.  
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Figure 2. UN peacekeeping scenario with DTN concept  
 
The types of services that are envisaged for this network 
are: 
 Limited, but reliable data exchange, Internet Access, 
Chat and E-mail for the UN personnel, aid workers 
and local population. 
 Vehicles and equipment tracking, positioning and 
emergency messages. These services require a 
combination of telecommunication and positioning 
systems.  
 Sensor networks for data collection in relation to the 
UN monitoring and operations.  
From security prospective, DTN-G1, DTN-G2, DTN-G3 
and DTN-G4 represent four security gateways in 
independent regions but can collaborate with each other.  
II. THREAT ANALYSIS 
In general, security threats can be divided into passive 
and active threats. The initial threat analysis of the above 
scenario shows that passive threats are a major concern due 
to the broadcast nature of satellites. One example is an 
intruder monitoring the satellite broadcast and then 
extracting some sensitive data. This includes eavesdropping 
and traffic analysis with the goal to obtain private 
information and gain knowledge about the communicating 
parties. 
Active threats (or attacks) are more difficult to implement 
successfully than passive threats and usually require more 
sophisticated resources and may also require access to the 
satellite terminal. Examples of active attacks are: 
 Masquerading: An entity pretends to be a different 
entity such as UN personnel, aid worker or 
legitimate local person.  The aim is gaining access to 
the network resources in an un-authorised way. 
 Modification of transmitted messages. This includes 
intruders trying to disrupt the UN operations in the 
war or conflict regions. 
 Replay attacks: Here an intruder sends some old 
(authentic) messages to the receiver. In the case of a 
broadcast link, access to previous broadcast data is 
easy. 
 Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: The aim of the 
attacker is preventing authorized users from 
accessing a service. For example, an intruder 
(attacker) can send a large number of bogus 
messages to a DTN Gateway in order to keep it busy 
and degrade the services to other users. 
Examining the above threats gives rise to DTN security 
requirements such as lightweight key management; 
lightweight AAA-like architecture for 
authentication/authorisation; resilience to Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks and providing anonymity to end users. The 
following sections elaborate each of these requirements. 
III. DTN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
Current Security Protocols do not perform well in high 
delay/disruption conditions, because of underlying 
assumption on which they are built, such as end-to-end 
connectivity is always present; low link delays between 
communicating parties and low error rate on link channels. 
Thus, new security architecture is needed to meet DTN 
requirements [3], [4].  
Figure 3 shows two DTN Bundle Nodes BN1 and BN2 
from two different networks connected to each other through 
DTN gateways BN2 and BN3.  Any DTN node originating 
or forwarding the data packet, stores it in its memory until it 
has been delivered to next node, showing “Store and 
Forward” style of communication. 
 
Figure 3.  Internetworking of DTN  Networks Using Bundle Gateways  
 
The security architecture supports hop-by-hop and end-
to-end authentication and integrity validation, to ensure data 
is correct before forwarding.  Figure 4 shows the hop-by hop 
authentication/integrity check using Bundle Authentication 
Block (BAB).  The BAB is used to assure the authenticity 
and integrity of the bundle along a single hop from forwarder 
to intermediate receiver. Thus, the communications path is 
divided into security zones in Figure 4. Similarly and for 
         
end-to-end security services, the Payload Integrity Block 
(PIB) and Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) are used. 
Further details on security architecture in DTN can be found 
in [4].  
 
Figure 4. Hop-by-hop authentication and integrity check [4] 
IV. KEY MANAGEMENT IN DTN 
To enable peacekeeping forces and aid workers to 
communicate securely,  all security services like 
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation etc, are required to 
be provided end-to-end and hop-by-hop within the DTN 
infrastructure.  Key Management is one of the most difficult 
problems in DTN security.  DTN security requires that 
before forwarding the bundle it must be authenticated and 
integrity checked. In DTN, link availability is an important 
resource and special techniques need to be applied to 
maximise the utilization of such link. The key management 
requirements can be summarised as follows:  
 A single key management scheme might not be 
sufficient for DTN networks due to heterogeneity of 
networks, like satellite networks, sensors networks 
etc. So, a whole framework is required to provide the 
services of key management.  
 Different kind of key transport and key agreement 
options should be provided to handle heterogeneity 
and also key management framework should provide 
schemes based on pre-shared secrets or manual keys.   
 As DTN architecture supports heterogeneity, so 
different nodes capabilities should be taken into 
consideration. It should be assured that proposed 
schemes are also suitable for very low powered 
devices as well.  
 The key management scheme should be adaptive and 
less chatty. The key management messages should be 
exchanged within minimum number of passes.  
Examining the requirements above, reveal that existing 
key management schemes are not suitable for DTN 
environment.  
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is widely used today and 
provides secure key transport, but incurs high computational 
cost. The large number of certificate verifications and 
certificates revocation lists check requires link and 
bandwidth availability. Thus, traditional PKI alone cannot 
provide good performance in DTN networks.  
DTN needs to support symmetric as well asymmetric 
cryptography in order to obtain robust security architecture. 
There are several symmetric key management protocols in 
existence. Although computationally less expensive than 
public key cryptography, symmetric cryptography use for 
key management requires larger number of message 
exchanges. This can be problematic in DTN environment. 
In DTN, security-source and security-destination can be 
different from data original-source and final-destination. 
Therefore delegation mechanism is required. Proxy 
certificates based schemes seem to be promising techniques 
[5]. 
Our current research focus is to formalize different key 
management parameters based on proxy certificates and 
PKIs, Kerberos based public key authentication mechanisms 
like PKINIT and M-PKINIT. A combination of these 
protocols (public and symmetric cryptography based 
mechanisms) can be manipulated to achieve a more efficient 
key management solution which will be more suitable for 
DTN networks. An example of PKI and Kerberos based 
security architecture is “Computationally Efficient PKI based 
Single Sign On protocol (PKASSO)” described in [6].  
V. AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORISATION IN DTN 
Authentication and Authorization are two processes that 
can be used to provide access control. This can be part of the 
key management procedures or performed separately. It 
protects the network from unauthenticated entities and usage 
of network resources from unauthorized entities. Centralized 
and decentralized architectures are known architectures for 
access control implementation [7]. The decentralized 
architecture is either distributed where access control 
decision is fully decentralized or hierarchical where access 
control decision is partially decentralized. The centralized 
architecture has a single entity responsible for making access 
control decisions and might use a single set of operational 
policies. The distributed architecture is ideal for multi-
regional networks with region-specific policies. In the 
hierarchical architecture [8], the regional access control 
decisions are delegated to the regional management centres 
or gateways.  The AAA (Authentication, Authorization and 
Accounting) architecture is an example of the centralized 
architecture. However, this architecture is known to have 
single point of failure and operational complexity.        
A workable access control framework in DTN that suits 
the UN Peace Keeping scenario (Figure 2) has the following 
requirements: 
 Separate authentication from authorization; 
  Prevent masquerading and modification attacks;  
 Support offline processing and internal decision making; 
 Reduce load on authentication/authorisation servers. 
With these in mind, the classical AAA architecture and 
the distributed trust models are considered not suitable for 
         
direct implementation in DTN. We therefore propose a 
lightweight hierarchical architecture based on the AAA 
architecture concept that uses a common parameter for data 
communication. The hierarchical architecture is a good 
choice because of the need for a centralized entity (third 
party) to coordinate and monitor the activities of the various 
regions (distributed) networks. We also opted for the AAA 
architecture concept because: of the implementation 
flexibility offered by the AAA standard and the three party 
authentication model facilitating secured communication in 
heterogeneous environment.  
As shown in Figure 5, the DTN-G4 of the UN 
Headquarter is the centralized entity that administers the 
DTN network and authenticates the participating 
organizations in this network. As examples, the Red Cross 
Society together with the British and American Armed 
Forces are participating organizations with distinct roles, and 
information destined for them must conform to their assigned 
roles. Each of the individual networks has a security gateway 
(access server). DTN-G4 authenticates the other security 
gateways during registration/service initialization phase and 
assigns them a network identity, role and common 
communication parameter for the data communication phase. 
The architecture is designed to allow the security gateways 
access to a section of messages routed through them to 
authenticate the source and determine the destination without 
having access to part of the message that is destined for the 
end user. Our future work will give a detailed description of 
the architecture and its components.  
In addition, implementing access control and AAA 
mechanisms will have impact on the network Quality of 
Service QoS which is still a new research field in DTN. For 
example, implementing AAA will produce more overheads 
and may degrade the performance from QoS prospective as 
more processing will be required. However, both (security 
and QoS) are important network services in today’s 
internetworked world and are not independent of each other 
because selecting one mechanism will impact the 
effectiveness of the other. Also, the access control process 
will have impact on the flow process (routing) of DTN 
bundles but yet, there is not identified mechanism for flow 
characteristic enhancement in DTN. Therefore it is still an 
active research field [9].   
 
Figure 5. Authentication / authorization Scenario for DTN  
VI. RESILIANCE TO DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS) ATTACKS  
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim at preventing 
legitimate users from accessing their entitled services. 
According to CERT’s classification, there are mainly three 
kinds of DoS attacks [10]: the consumption of scarce, 
limited, or non-renewable resources, destruction or alteration 
of configurable information and the physical destruction or 
alteration of network components. We focus on resource 
consumption attacks, where the DTN architecture forbids the 
carriage of illegitimate traffic due to resource scarcity. In 
order to prevent an unauthorised entity from masquerading 
as UN personnel, aid worker or a legitimate local person, it is 
mandatory to authenticate traffic at all nodes which 
implement the bundle layer security [3]. 
The security gateways (DTN-G1, 2, 3 and 4) are critical 
components since they provide access to and from the 
different regions. Our focus will be on the protection of these 
security gateways against DoS attacks. Normally, these 
gateways (acting as authentication and access control points) 
use public key cryptography to authenticate clients. 
However, protocols that use strong authentication from the 
beginning can be used as a hook by an attacker to cause 
availability problems in the network. The reason is that 
public key algorithms use computationally expensive 
methods such as exponentiation and factorization to provide 
security.  Therefore weak authentication mechanisms are 
required for DTN environment such as cookies [11] and the 
client puzzles techniques [12].  However, they are not 
suitable for deployment in DTN because both require several 
messages exchanges.  
We define a number of security and networking 
requirements to guide our design towards protecting the 
security gateways from DoS attacks. The security 
requirements include: 
 All traffic must be authenticated to verify the 
validity of the source through the hop-by-hop and 
end-to-end security features of the DTN architecture. 
 Ensure availability by using lightweight 
authentication. 
 Ensure data freshness by preventing the replay of old 
messages through the use of timestamps, sequence 
numbers and nonces. 
 Ensure the integrity of messages to provide the 
assurance that bundle content has not been modified. 
In terms of the networking requirements, the design 
should have:  
 Resilience to delays and disruptions which may be in 
the order of minutes, hours or days. 
 Ability to operate even when no end-to-end path 
exists from source to destination. 
 Ability to withstand changes in scheduling and/or in 
contact of nodes. 
         
In our initial design, we will assume that the attacker has 
unbounded resources. The security gateways have bounded 
resources that can be exhausted by a clever attacker.  We 
assume that the attacker has the ability to replay, modify, 
transmit, receive, and execute the protocol. In order to 
achieve our objective, we add a light-weight authenticator 
(cookie) to every bundle which is evaluated by the gateway 
first (the weak authentication phase). Any traffic that fails the 
weak authentication is discarded immediately. The cookie 
verification will only require small amount of computational 
processing. As such, only a small amount of gateway 
resources are used in this phase. Otherwise, the client is 
allowed to proceed to the strong authentication phase (i.e. 
digital signature verification). 
VII. ANONYMITY AND PSEUDONYM IN DTN  
Traditional encryption hides transmitted data from 
intruders.  However, the sender and receiver address, packet 
length and packet timings can provide useful information to 
adversaries (intruders) to achieve traffic analysis attacks. So 
this gives rise to the idea of identity protection and 
anonymity. Anonymity is the non identifiable state within a 
set of subjects. To achieve anonymity researchers define 
anonymous protocols in which we dealt with initiator/sender, 
receiver/recipient anonymity and their unlinkability (who is 
with whom). Anonymous protocol should prevent message 
coding attack, timing analysis, message volume analysis and 
flooding attacks [13]. Generally Anonymous Protocols are 
based on idea of Mix Network by David Chaum’s and onion 
routing. 
However, the above traditional solution for anonymity 
doesn’t work in DTN because of the disconnect nature and 
routing strategy of DTN. With opportunistic and variable 
delays, source routing is not always possible. In DTN, there 
is no complete routing topology so Onion Routing (e.g. 
TOR) doesn’t work because in TOR needs to know the route 
in advance and encrypt the message accordingly for each 
router. Mix networks can be applied to DTN as they hold the 
message for random amount of time and flushes when all 
packets arrived. To overcome these limitations, we provide 
DTN anonymity architecture with pseudonym based 
approach. 
With reference to the UN peacekeeping force (Figure 2), 
DTN-G1 and DTN-G2 can send their secret information to 
the headquarter (DTN-G4) by encrypting it. The additional 
requirement here is to keep the identity of the end users 
(sender and receiver ID and IP address) secret. Examples in 
the UN peacekeeping scenario will be hiding the identity of 
high profile users such as high ranking UN and local 
officials. One possible technique can be the use of 
Pseudonyms. Pseudonym means falsely named (name other 
then the real name). In our scenario, we assume that each 
pseudonym is reference to one holder and can’t be 
transferred to other subjects.  
Assuming that DTN gateways (DTN-G1, 2, 3 and 4) are 
fully trusted and well known.  Even with the possibility of an 
intermediate DTN router being compromised, the intruder 
will not be able to link the pseudonyms to the real user 
identity. 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
DTN concept is suitable for space as well as terrestrial 
wireless networks. An overview of DTN architecture and 
security threats was introduced together with an example 
scenario of the UN peacekeeping force using DTN concept. 
Paper shows that traditional key management, 
authentication/authorisation and DoS resilience methods are 
not suitable for DTN networks due to the long delays, 
disruptions and bandwidth limitations.  The paper defines the 
specific requirements that are needed and some possible 
initial solutions.  The paper also presents some initial work 
on user anonymity in DTN using pseudonym.   
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